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A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION  
AND THE INTERPRETATION OF ITS LEGISLATIVE INTENT  
BY THE SUPREME COURT  
by  
CARL E. BRODY, JR.*  
"It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it that makes the law. The letter of 
the law is the body; the sense and reason of the law is the soul."1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In its recent decision in Adarand Constructors v. Pena,2 the United States Supreme Court 
determined that federal racial classifications should receive strict scrutiny, thereby 
making it more difficult for these programs to pass constitutional muster. In an opinion 
authored by Justice O'Connor, the Majority argued that there is a similarity between 
affirmative action programs employing racial classifications for the benefit of minorities 
and invidious racial classifications excluding African-Americans from equal employment 
opportunities.3 This interpretation fails to take into account the actuality that federal 
affirmative action programs emanate from Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,4 which were meant to alleviate discrimination against minorities and women. The 
Supreme Court has consistently understood that "[T]he alleviation of discrimination 
against African-Americans was the import of the Fourteenth Amendment."5 Further, the 
majority of these programs do not require employers to hire minorities or women,6 but 
merely encourage government employers, or private employers receiving government 
contracts, to treat all citizens fairly by becoming more inclusive in the employment 
process. The Adarand court has lost sight of the spirit of not only the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but also of the landmark remedial legislation enacted in 1964.  
The Supreme Court should respect the original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Civil Rights Acts, and acknowledge the underlying rationale for 
affirmative action programs in formulating the appropriate analysis to be used in 
scrutinizing federal, state, and private affirmative action programs. Particularly, the Court 
should understand the historical context motivating the enactments of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the 1964 Civil Rights Act.7 Therefore, I argue that by applying a strict 
contructionist interpretation to the legislative intent of these civil rights laws, the 
Supreme Court should affirm the underlying rationale for affirmative action programs 
and return to a more lenient level of scrutiny when analyzing these programs.8  
In Part I, I will discuss the history of pre-affirmative action programs. This involves an 
analysis of the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, its related remedial 
legislation,9 as well as several of the New Deal Acts prohibiting employment 
discrimination. Part II will analyze the advent of affirmative action, from its inception 
with the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts, and trace its development through Executive 
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Orders 12250 and 12259, which constitute the last major expansion in affirmative action 
doctrine. Part III will examine the period between 1978 and 1991, where the Supreme 
Court's attempts to find a consistent interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and the 
level of scrutiny applicable to affirmative action programs will be addressed. Part IV will 
examine Adarand,10 and the reasoning behind the decision. Finally, I will conclude with 
the direction courts should take in future cases involving affirmative action programs.  
II. PART I: THE PRE-AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ERA  
The first major piece of civil rights legislation in the United States, the Thirteenth 
Amendment, was enacted to abolish slavery.11 This amendment was the first proactive 
advancement in race relations in the history of this country, and was designed to end the 
virulent racism that had always been present. President Lincoln's Emancipation 
Proclamation not only liberated the slaves in the Confederacy, but allowed slavery to 
continue in unincorporated areas.12 Therefore, it was necessary to alter the Constitution in 
order to put an end to slavery in all parts of the country.  
A. The 1864 and 1865 Freedmen's Bureau Bills  
The Thirteenth Amendment, while liberating former slaves, did not solve the problem of 
racism directed toward newly-freed slaves by their fellow citizens, nor did it address the 
problem of assimilating the newly-freed slaves into white society. As a result, Congress 
proposed the 1864 Freedmen's Bureau Bill with the specific intent to provide special 
assistance to the newly freed slaves.13 This legislation specifically designated African-
Americans as the beneficiaries of programs meant to assist in the transition from 
slavery.14 Proponents of the bill argued that it was necessary in order to atone for the past 
discrimination visited against the former slaves.15 They also argued that the provision of 
race specific benefits would allow the former slaves to become self-sufficient, and would 
prevent them from becoming wards of the nation.16 Thus, as is the case today, proponents 
of race conscious measures advanced the ideology that providing measures to assist those 
who have been and are presently discriminated against benefits the nation as a whole, 
because these members of society will be able to contribute to the community, and will 
not exist as liabilities to the nation.  
Opponents of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill employed arguments very similar to those who 
oppose affirmative action today. Their main argument questioned the logic of 
promulgating legislation that was specifically intended to benefit only African-
Americans.17 The opponents considered it unfair that impoverished white citizens would 
not benefit from this bill. Here lies the origin of the notion that legislation should apply to 
all citizens equally, and that ours should be a "colorblind society."18 This argument 
glosses over past and present inequities in favor of a system that allows the continuation 
of those inequities.19  
The final version of the bill did not pass until 1865, when it was amended in order to 
include white refugees as beneficiaries.20 In practice, though, the majority of the benefits 
went to freedmen.21 Therefore, by the end of the Civil War, the nation had taken its first, 
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halting steps to provide special assistance to remedy past discrimination. The 
constitutionality of providing such programs to one racial group exclusively was still an 
open question, but the Freedmen's Bureau Bills nevertheless acknowledged the race of 
the individuals entitled to receipt of the benefits of the programs.  
B. The Fourteenth Amendment  
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted primarily to guarantee the constitutionality of 
the race conscious measures established in the Freedmen's Bureau Acts, which were 
subsequently affirmed through the Civil Rights Act of 1866,22 and to address the 
problems of racism during the post Civil War period.23 In fact, Congress debated the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Bill 24 simultaneously.25 This 
historical fact illustrates that the two provisions are inseparable. The reasoning behind 
one is also the reasoning behind the other. In the case of both, the protection of the equal 
rights of African-Americans was of primary focus.26 The Fourteenth Amendment was 
meant to validate race conscious policies found in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 27 and the 
Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866.28  
Amending the Constitution became necessary because of President Johnson's decision to 
veto the original versions of the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act of 
1866. In both cases, the President made classic conservative arguments. Johnson claimed 
that providing special provisions to former slaves while not providing the same 
provisions for unfortunate whites was unfair.29 In his veto of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 
President Johnson explained that, in his mind, the distinction between race in the bill 
would benefit African-Americans while unfairly disadvantaging whites.30 This rhetoric is 
very similar to the race baiting tactics currently employed by many of those arguing 
against present day affirmative action programs, where whites are thought of as being 
pitted against African-Americans.31  
Both the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights Act of 1866 were meant to provide the 
newly freed slaves with some opportunity to become viable members of the society. 
Achieving this goal necessarily required measures that applied directly to the group that 
had been wronged for the previous three centuries. Yet when Congress attempted to enact 
such a remedy, those against providing assistance to the downtrodden determined that the 
one characteristic that caused the former slaves to be enslaved, i.e., the color of their skin, 
could not now be used to thwart efforts to ameliorate the condition of ex-slaves. In the 
twisted, conservative logic, assisting African-Americans might unfairly injure white 
citizens.  
In contrast, proponents of the 1866 Acts supported race conscious measures because such 
action directly assisted those who had been discriminated against. The proponents openly 
acknowledged race as a factor and felt that because it had been a factor in the 
enslavement and continued discrimination against the ex-slaves, it could now be taken 
into account in fashioning a remedy for nearly 300 years of inequality.32 Therefore, 
Congress overrode President Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and 
subsequently passed a new Freedmen's Bureau Bill that was even more race specific than 
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the previously vetoed Freedmen's Bureau legislation.33 Johnson also vetoed the 1866 
Freedmen's Bureau Act, but once again his veto was subsequently overridden.34  
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted by the Congress during the same debates and 
discussions concerning the effective provision of remedies for past and present 
discrimination for former slaves. Therefore, the Amend ment must be analyzed in this 
context, which acknowledges the effects of discrimination on African-Americans, and 
must be recognized as being designed to guarantee the constitutionality of race conscious 
measures employed to improve their situation.35  
In 1875, the Supreme Court began to retreat from assisting Congressional efforts to 
assimilate African-Americans into post-civil war society. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 36 
was enacted to provide African-Americans with equal access to public accommodations, 
including inns, public consequences, theaters, and "other places of public amusement."37 
By its terms, the Act applied to private individuals,38 and made violations criminal 
misdemeanors.39 Several white owners of private hotels, theaters, and railroads had 
policies excluding African-Americans, and were indicted under the Act. They challenged 
the Act as an invalid exercise of Congress' enforcement powers pursuant to the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. In a case that came to be known simply as the Civil Rights 
Cases,40 the Supreme Court consolidated the challenges for resolution of the issues 
presented.41  
The Court first rejected the government's contention that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
could be promulgated under Congress's enforcement power in Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.42 The court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment only applied 
to state action, and could not be used to regulate private conduct.43 Thus, the court held 
that Congress had no power to prevent private theater owners, innkeepers, and railroad 
operators from discriminating against African-Americans.  
Second, the Court rejected the proposition that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment 44 
gave Congress the power to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1875.45 Although the Court 
acknowledged that the Thirteenth Amendment not only abolished slavery,46 but also 
prohibited the imposition of any "badges or incidents of slavery,"47 the Court determined 
that private policies of discrimination against African-Americans did not amount to 
imposing a "badge or incident" of slavery on them.48 In so holding, the Court reiterated 
the notion that Congress should make no attempt to enact race-conscious laws, and that 
ours should be a "colorblind" society:  
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent 
legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there 
must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank 
of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and 
when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary 
modes by which other men's rights are protected.49 
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In his lengthy dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the majority failed to acknowledge the 
intent of the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate all "burdens and 
disabilities which constitute badges of slavery and servitude."50 Harlan considered overt, 
private acts of discrimination to be such "badges of slavery."51 Harlan also argued that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to secure and protect the rights of African-
Americans as citizens of this country,52 and that the Amendment vested in them a right of 
exemption from race discrimination.53 Harlan explained that the framers of the Four 
teenth Amendment intended to confer upon Congress the power to redress "the great 
danger to the equal enjoyment by [African-American] citizens of their rights, as citizens, . 
. . [posed], not altogether [by] unfriendly state legislation, but [also] [by] the hostile 
actions of corporations and individuals in the states."54  
Justice Harlan thus examined, and would have implemented, the true intent of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to provide special legal protections for African-
American citizens. The modern-day Supreme Court could learn from Justice Harlan's 
example, and should have likewise respected the original intent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in analyzing the constitutionality of affirmative action programs.  
C. The New Deal Era Laws  
During the Great Depression, economic hardship and massive unemployment forced the 
government to provide programs to assist the citizenry. The Roosevelt Administration 
implemented many laws for this purpose, and included in them prohibitions against racial 
discrimination.55 These New Deal laws required employers to be inclusive in their 
employment practices, and constituted the first attempt to do so since the era of "separate 
but equal" legislation introduced during the 19th Century.56 Indeed, the Public Works 
Administration, which was created pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act,57 
provided for quotas in employment in order to assure employment inclusiveness.58 
President Roosevelt also issued the first executive order prohibiting employment 
discrimination based on race.59  
By the end of the New Deal Era, the government had made its first attempt since 
Reconstruction to eliminate discrimination. Though the group meant to be protected was 
not specified, it is obvious from the surrounding circumstances that such legislation was 
meant to address discrimination against African-American and other minority citizens, 
because these were the individuals being discriminated against. These programs were 
specifically meant to provide equality in employment opportunity and encouraged 
employers to be more inclusive in providing employment.60 Therefore, these 
requirements provided the ground work for future programs to eliminate employment 
discrimination.  
III. PART II: THE ADVENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION  
During the period from 1954 to 1978, the nation made great strides in resolving the 
dilemma of race relations in America. This naturally had the effect of addressing 
employment discrimination and examining methods for achieving its elimination. This 
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also required an examination of the overall effect centuries of discrimination had on the 
employment opportunities of African-Americans. Furthermore, an examination of the 
effect of existent discrimination was necessary. In response to these questions, the 
government decided laws both prohibiting discrimination in employment and providing 
some type of remedial programs were necessary. Affirmative action programs benefiting 
those recipients of past and present discrimination were borne out of this atmosphere.  
A. The End of Separate but Equal  
The Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education,61 began the process of 
dismantling the officially segregated society that had been in place throughout the entire 
history of the United States, but discrimination in employment continued.  
To determine the extent of discrimination, then Vice-President Richard Nixon, pursuant 
to the Committee on Government Contracts, conducted a review and compiled a report 
addressing the overall situation concerning the effects of race on employment. In the 
report, it was determined that, "the indifference of employers to establishing a positive 
policy of non-discrimination hinders qualified applicants and employees from being hired 
and promoted on the basis of equality."62 Nixon further determined that schools, training 
institutions, recruitment, and referral services emulated this nonchalance concerning the 
inclusion of African-Americans.63 In effect, this general apathy served to perpetuate the 
problems of inequity that minimized opportunities for African-American citizens.  
The report demonstrated that even if overt discrimination did not exist, a covert, societal 
type of discrimination flourished. This covert type of discrimination had no malicious 
intent, but the effect still denied employment opportunities to African-Americans. Covert 
discrimination operates to perpetuate the status quo, and to retain discriminatory policies 
and practices. It provides a comfort level for those employing it, allowing the retention of 
certain presumptions concerning the efficacy of long standing practices. The comfort 
level itself is not an act of discrimination, because it is important to maximize economic 
efficiency by reducing racial friction in the workplace. Thus present problems were 
solved with solutions that have been used in the past. The problem is that the comfort 
level was achieved during a period when African-Americans and other minorities were 
not welcomed, thereby excluding them from becoming part of the accepted norm. 
Therefore, in the employment context, African-Americans were, and still are, excluded 
because society wants to retain the comfort level, which manifests itself in what Vice 
President Nixon referred to as "indifference". Though this is not overt discrimination, the 
effect is equally invidious.64  
Therefore, in the employment arena, African-Americans still suffered from the residue of 
the "separate but equal" era. If not for the blatant racism instituted during that era, 
African-American citizens might have received an opportunity to participate more fully 
in society, thereby making their inclusion the norm.  
To address the inequities of employment discrimination, President Kennedy issued 
Executive Order 10,925,65 which prohibited discrimination and required contractors to 
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pledge to take affirmative action to ensure that applicants for employment be considered 
without regard to race. The import of the order, therefore, was to eliminate racial 
discrimination against African-Americans by those entities receiving government 
contracts.66  
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Titles VI & VII  
Congress strengthened Executive Order 10,925 by incorporating it into Titles VI and VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thereby providing the legislative basis for equal 
employment opportunity laws and affirmative action programs.67 The United States 
Senate explicitly noted that the Act included the affirmative action program set forth in 
Executive Order 10,925 in the administration provisions of Title VII.68 Congress thus 
illustrated its intent that Title VII would bring about the elimination of discrimination 
against African-Americans. The overall effect of passing Title VI and Title VII was 
congressional recognition of Executive Order 10,925.  
1. Title VI 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d,69 prohibits any 
program or activity that receives federal financial assistance from discriminating on the 
basis of race, color, or national origin.70 Section 2000d-1 authorizes federal agencies to 
issue regulations enforcing section 2000d.71 Each federal agency is required to formulate 
its own rules to determine whether the beneficiaries of their agency's aid are in 
compliance with provisions proscribing discrimination against minorities. This is a far 
reaching provision, considering the number of private entities that receive federal aid or 
enter into contracts with the government. Therefore, the overall effect of the legislation is 
to provide some regulatory authority for government agencies to prohibit discrimination 
by private entities receiving federal funds..  
Where the beneficiary of a federal contract or aid is found to be in violation of section 
2000d, the donor agency or department may issue a sanction in the form of termination, 
discontinuance of assistance, or any other legally authorized penalty.72 Due Process 
requires that no penalty may be enforced until the party in violation receives an 
opportunity for a hearing to determine noncompliance.73 Furthermore, where an agency 
determines that the beneficiary is not in compliance, and a sanction is levied, any action 
taken against the violator is limited to the particular program in violation, and does not 
effect other unrelated programs involving the same entity.74 The agency narrowly 
enforces the statute so that it will not arbitrarily penalize an other wise fair institution or 
entity. When an action of termination or discontinuance of a grant, loan or contract is 
imposed, the head of the acting agency is required to file a written report with the 
appropriate committees in the House and Senate explaining the grounds for the action.75 
Therefore, any beneficiary of a government grant or other financial aid is subject to 
substantial incentives to comply with the non-discrimination requirements of the 
individual agency.  
2. Title VII 
7
Brody: A Historical Review of Affirmative Action
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 76 defines the terms used in its Equal Employment 
Opportunity provisions. Title VII's definition of "person" includes almost all public and 
private entities, thereby providing private sector employees with the ability to seek 
redress of grievances if their employer is intentionally engaging in discriminatory 
employment practices.77 Title VII exempts small businesses from compliance by 
providing that it applies only to businesses with fifteen or more employees.78 The gender 
protecting language, "on the basis of sex," is interpreted to provide that pregnant women 
receive equal treatment on the job, notwithstanding their pregnancy. Also, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 amended this section to include the "Glass Ceiling Act of 1991," 
which addresses the problem of minorities and women not receiving access to upper 
management level positions.80  
Section 2000e-2 provides that it is an unlawful employment practice to discriminate 
against a person because of race, sex, national origin, or religion.81 All aspects of 
employment are protected from discriminatory activities by employers, including hiring, 
firing, compensation, and terms, conditions or privileges of employment.82 Title VII also 
makes it unlawful for an employer to classify employees or applicants in any way that 
would tend to deprive individuals of equal employment opportunities.83 This section 
provides the basis for lawsuits by both minorities and non-minorities, when a party 
believes that employment discrimination is occurring. Section 2000e-2 also provides that 
preferential treatment is not required if there is a statistical imbalance between the work 
force and the general population.84 Therefore, claims that federal affirmative action 
provisions require racial or gender quotas are untrue, indeed such strict quotas would be 
in violation of Title VII.85  
Section 2000e-4 86 creates the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The 
Commission is granted the authority to provide federal agencies, and other entities 
subject to this Title, with technical assistance in compliance. Section 2000e-5 87 confers 
authority on the Commission to prevent a party from engaging in unlawful employment 
practices. The Commission is vested with the authority to make an investigation of any 
employer alleged to be engaged in discriminatory employment practices. If the 
investigation shows reasonable cause to believe the charge, the Commission will attempt 
to apply informal methods to alleviate the problem.88 If within thirty days there is no 
agreement, the Commission may bring a civil action against the employer.89 If the 
employer is a public agency or political subdivision, the case will be referred to the 
Department of Justice, which may bring a civil action at its discretion.  
Where an individual alleging an unlawful employment practice resides in a state that has 
its own anti-discrimination laws, and its own state agency governing these complaints, 
the EEOC will not file any charges for sixty days in order to give the state agency an 
opportunity to act. Similarly, if a complaint is first filed with the EEOC, the EEOC will 
notify the appropriate state agency and allow them to apply state law before taking any 
action.90 The overall intent is to allow state agencies to implement their own programs 
and proceed ings to eliminate discrimination, thereby providing a more effective 
mechanism for achieving the congressional goal of eliminating employment 
discrimination.  
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Section 2000e-5 permits a court to enjoin anyone found to be intention ally engaging in 
an unlawful employment practice. The injunction may in clude an order to implement an 
affirmative action plan, reinstatement, back pay, and any other equitable relief that the 
court deems appropriate.91  
C. Equal Opportunity in Federal Employment  
Section 2000e-16 92 prohibits discrimination in federal employment by providing that all 
personnel actions affecting employees or applicants will be non-discriminatory. The 
EEOC is authorized to enforce this policy, and it has accordingly issued procedural 
regulations 93 to carry out this responsibility.94 These regulations should provide only a 
general outline, because each agency is required to formulate its own policy. The 
requirement is that each agency provide training and education programs which are 
intended to provide the greatest opportunity for employees to succeed. The agencies must 
also provide information concerning the efforts that are being undertaken within the 
agency, in terms of interagency functions, to provide a legitimate equal employment 
opportunity program. Therefore, the overall intent is to provide a federal government 
work force that offers opportunities equally. Section 2000e-17,95 provides that companies 
with approved affirmative action programs will not have government contracts denied 
because of an Equal Employment Opportunity order unless the company has substantially 
deviated from the original plan.  
D. The Civil Rights Act of 1991  
In 1991, Title VII was amended 96 in response to the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio.97 In Wards Cove, the Court weakened 
the scope and effectiveness of federal civil rights protections by requiring an employment 
discrimination plaintiff to identify the specific employment practice that is challenged, 
and to illustrate how that practice creates a "disparate impact."98 After the plaintiff 
satisfies this burden, the Court explained that the employer would receive an opportunity 
to rebut the prima facie case by demonstrating that the challenged practice serves, in a 
significant way, legitimate employment interests.99 In summary, the Court determined 
that under a disparate impact theory of employment discrimination, the ultimate burden 
of proof is on the plaintiff.100  
Congress amended Title VII to require an employer to justify its employment practices 
that caused a disparate impact.101 This amendment was intended to overrule Wards 
Cove.102 In effect, then, after the plaintiff demonstrates that an employment practice has a 
disparate impact, typically through the use of statistical data, the entire burden of proof 
shifts to the employer. The Act also provides that a demonstration of business necessity 
will no longer protect an employer engaging in intentional discrimination.103 Thus, by 
shifting the burden of proof, Congress reaffirmed its interest in requiring employers to 
maintain equal employment opportunity by eschewing employment practices having 
discriminatory effects.  
9
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Overall, nothing in the federal statutes requires a private firm to incorporate affirmative 
action programs into its employment strategy. The private sector can only be required to 
undertake affirmative action when ordered by a court, upon a finding that the employer 
engaged in intentional discrimination.104 Upon such a finding, a court will have authority 
to order the non complying firm to take "affirmative action" to remedy the situation.105 
Therefore, Congress intended Title VII to prohibit only overt discrimination; it does not 
require private affirmative action plans for a firm that is not receiving government funds. 
Conversely, employees of private firms receiving federal funds retain the right to enforce 
minimal equal employment opportunity requirements by obtaining court ordered 
affirmative action. The government itself is also required to adhere to its own affirmative 
action requirements.  
This examination of the federal statutes is intended to provide a more appropriate 
understanding of the legislative intent behind Title VII. Under Title VII, Congress 
provided three differing standards for: 1) purely private firms: 2) private firms receiving 
federal funds: and 3) federal agencies. These standards are contingent on the ability of the 
government to eliminate employment discrimination. Therefore the Court should take 
this into consideration when encountering affirmative action cases involving the federal 
government. The overall intent behind these important civil rights statutes, and the 
federal government's ability to realize its goal of equal employment, should be 
paramount. Therefore, courts should relax the level of scrutiny, depending on the amount 
of federal involvement, thereby providing greater deference to congressional intent to be 
more proactive where federal funds are involved.  
E. The Executive Orders  
A number of Executive Orders were issued beginning in 1965 to facilitate the legislative 
intent of Titles VI and VII to eliminate the effects of prior discrimination. In 1965, 
President Lyndon Johnson issued Executive Order No. 11,246,106 which required 
government contractors to implement a non-discrimination policy in their employment 
practices. The order provided that each contractor must include, in the contract itself, a 
written affirmation not to discriminate on the basis of race.107 The Department of Labor 
was empowered to investigate employee complaints, and to verify compliance by 
reviewing the contractor's employment records 108 If the Secretary of Labor found non-
compliance, he or she was empowered to either cancel, suspend, or terminate the 
contract.109 These same requirements continue to apply to federal contracts today 
pursuant to section 602 of Title VII 110 and administrative regulations.  
Affirmative action programs further evolved during the late 1960s and throughout the 
1970s. The first and most important action came in August of 1969 when President 
Richard Nixon issued Executive Order 11,478,111 which superseded Executive Order 
11,246. This order required all federal agencies and departments to implement 
"affirmative programs" to effectuate the policy prohibiting discrimination and to provide 
equal employment opportunity.112 The EEOC was entrusted with the responsibility of 
administering the program.113  
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In 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12,067,114 which granted the 
EEOC authority to develop standards and guidelines for federal agencies to follow in 
complying with equal employment opportunity laws. In October of 1978, President 
Carter issued Order No. 12,086,115 designating the Secretary of Labor as the party 
responsible for enforcing Parts II and III of Order No. 11,246 the Johnson Order 
requiring non-discrimination provisions in government contracts. Order 12,086 directed 
the Secretary of Labor to ensure compliance.  
In 1980, President Carter issued Executive Order 12,250 116which required the 
Department of Justice to insure that all federal agencies extending financial assistance 
properly enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Section 2000d-1 originally provided for 
approval of agency rules by the President, but pursuant to Executive Order 12,250, the 
approval function was delegated to the Attorney General. Also under Order 12,250, the 
Attorney General's authority was delegated to the Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
Rights Division. The authority of the Assistant Attorney General was extended to cover 
the issuance of directives and the initiation of other actions deemed necessary to enforce 
Title VI. Later in 1980, Executive Order 12,259 117 was issued. It encouraged the 
Attorney General and heads of executive agencies to work together to provide 
consistency among the federal agencies in the implementation of these provisions.  
Each agency is required to submit proposed regulations enforcing Title VI to the 
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division. After approval, the agency regulations 
would then be published, thereby providing all potential beneficiaries with a complete 
understanding of the correct guidelines.118 Each federal agency must provide for the 
collection of data and information from federal assistance applicants and recipients.119 
Each potential beneficiary is also required to submit to the donor agency information 
concerning the beneficiary's past civil rights record, and the enforcement mechanisms 
used to assure that the beneficiary is providing equal opportunity.120 The particular 
agency's civil rights office will review the potential beneficiary's record to determine 
whether the beneficiary should receive the federal aid. This takes the form of a written 
assurance of compliance. Agencies must also maintain a program of post-approval review 
to assure that the beneficiary maintains non-discriminatory policies.121 The effect of these 
orders is to maximize governmental authority to require private firms to use 
nondiscriminatory employment practices.  
The Attorney General provides guidelines for the enforcement of Title VI in order to 
provide a framework from which the agencies may implement their own rules.122 These 
guidelines supply alternative remedies in situations where an agency determines that a 
beneficiary is not complying with Title VI. The guidelines are intended to assist agency 
heads in pursuing a course of action that will effectively address the situation of a 
noncomplying beneficiary of federal funds.  
Pursuant to these guidelines, the ultimate sanction the agency may levy against a 
potential beneficiary is refusal to grant aid or termination of aid. However, safeguards are 
in place to protect potential beneficiaries from being denied aid arbitrarily. For example, 
before sanctions may be imposed, the agency must determine that it cannot obtain 
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compliance voluntarily, and alternative courses of action will not attain compliance.123 
The potential beneficiary is also afforded an opportunity for judicial review,124 thereby 
providing the applicant due process rights similar to those of an actual beneficiary. 
Alternatively, the agency may pursue court enforcement or administrative actions if 
voluntary compliance cannot be achieved.  
The guidelines further provide for the situation in which the beneficiary is allowed to 
receive one time or non continuing aid. In these situations, where the requisite assurances 
have not been satisfied, the recommendation is for the agency to withhold aid until the 
potential beneficiary complies with the Title VI requirements.  
State agencies receiving federal financial assistance must also comply with these 
requirements by establishing Title VI compliance programs to assure that beneficiaries of 
their programs are in compliance.125 Each state program must have a person in charge of 
enforcement, and the enforcement must satisfy federal minimum standards. This 
requirement is meant to provide an injured party with a local outlet, and it also allows for 
local regulation of state and local companies and agencies.  
Overall, the period between 1958 and 1980 saw the United States' greatest advancement 
in the area of providing equal employment opportunity for all citizens. The catalyst for 
these initiatives was the racial and gender discrimination that the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
sought to eliminate. Moreover, the legislature's imposition of affirmative action 
requirements on an employer with government contracts suggests that Title VII was 
meant to apply in a more strict fashion toward entities receiving federal funds. 
Subsequent executive orders implemented this mandate. Therefore, two of the three 
branches of government clearly supported and advanced the purpose of Title VII, leaving 
it to the Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of these actions and the actions 
of private entities complying with the equal employment opportunity laws.  
IV. PART III: THE COURT'S ATTEMPT TO FIND CONSENSUS  
During the 1980s, the Supreme Court struggled to determine the correct level of scrutiny 
that affirmative action programs must satisfy in order to remain constitutionally 
permissible. The process of determining an applicable standard was made even more 
difficult because of the shifting legal theories used by plaintiffs in asserting their cause of 
action, and because in each case a different type of affirmative action program was being 
questioned. Actions challenging affirmative action programs brought during this period 
were variously resolved by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment and Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, thereby requiring different constitutional interpretations 
of different racial or gender classifications. The Court was also required to decide the 
constitutionality of different types of affirmative action. These differing approaches 
involved distinguishing between the status of the entity implementing the affirmative 
action program.  
In this section, I will analyze the Court's interpretations of these different types of 
affirmative action programs by examining the basis upon which these decisions were 
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made. Particular attention will be paid to the Court's acknowledgment and interpretation 
of the legislative intent behind the federal legislation at issue.  
A. Voluntary Private Affirmative Action  
Voluntary private affirmative action has thus far been the least controversial of all 
affirmative action programs.126 The issue involved concerns the ability of a private entity 
to use proactive measures to remedy past and present discrimination. Private affirmative 
action is unique because neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable; 
there is no government action involved. Therefore, plaintiffs seeking redress from private 
affirmative action programs are required to use Title VII.  
The seminal case in this area is United Steelworkers v. Weber.127 Weber involved an 
affirmative action plan contained within a collective bargaining agreement between 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation and the United Steelworkers. The plan was 
meant to eliminate the imbalance that existed in the company's nearly all-white craft 
workforce. The company decided to begin a new training program to teach employees the 
necessary skills to become a craft worker, and made the program available to both Af 
rican-Americans and whites. However, because African-Americans had his torically been 
excluded from craft unions, the bargaining agreement required fifty percent of the new 
trainees to be African-American. This requirement would remain in place until the 
percentage of African-American craft work ers in the plant approximated the percentage 
of African-Americans in the local community.  
Brian Weber, a white production worker wishing to participate in the training program, 
was not chosen to participate, even though he had more seniority than several of the 
African-American workers chosen. Thereafter, Weber challenged the plan as being 
discriminatory on the basis of race in violation of Title VII. Weber argued that a literal 
interpretation of sections 703(a) and (b) prohibited race-conscious affirmative action 
plans. He also argued that the analysis of Title VII should be applied evenly, regardless 
of the race of the allegedly injured party. This argument is presently used by opponents of 
affirmative action, who assert that the civil rights laws should apply equally to blacks as 
well as whites. While the Court acknowledged some empathy for this argument, it 
nonetheless interpreted Title VII in light of the legislative intent.  
Writing for the Majority, Justice Brennan explained that Title VII should be interpreted 
within the historical context of its creation.128 When Congress created Title VII, it 
intended to provide protections to African-American citizens in the arena of employment, 
thereby giving them a fair and equal opportunity to be included within society's economic 
sphere.129 The Court determined that affirmative action achieved this goal, and it would 
be counterproductive and contrary to the intent of the law to eliminate programs intended 
to further the goal.130  
Justice Brennan next proceeded to interpret section 703(j), which explicitly prohibits 
quotas, to allow for affirmative action programs. Brennan explained that if the legislature 
intended to prohibit all voluntary private affirmative action, it would have declared that 
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an employer is not required to engage in affirmative action to balance its workforce, and 
such actions would be impermissible.131 Indeed, the intent of Title VII was to avoid 
undue federal intrusion 132 an idea with which most conservatives should feel most 
comfortable. In conclusion, Justice Brennan explained that Congress enacted Title VII to 
eliminate the last vestiges of discrimination in this country,133 and because affirmative 
action programs were helpful to this endeavor,134 they were permissible under the Act.  
As can be seen from the majority opinion in Weber, the Court understood the legislative 
intent of Title VII, and specifically followed its mandate. In so doing, the Court laid out a 
judicial standard to determine the permissibility of private affirmative action programs 
according to this understanding. The Court determined that the purpose of the plan must: 
1) be to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories, 
2) not be an absolute bar to the interests of white employees, or otherwise "unnecessarily 
trammel" their interests, and 3) be a temporary measure intended merely to achieve racial 
balance rather than to maintain racial balance.135 Therefore, by following the legislative 
intent of Title VII, the Court confirmed the permissibility of affirmative action programs, 
but limited their scope to prevent any abuses that might occur.  
B. Court Ordered Programs  
Under Section 706(g) of Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment, federal courts have 
the authority to order public and private employers to implement race or gender 
conscious affirmative action programs. This remedy is provided only in the most 
egregious of circumstances, and only when the remedy is narrowly tailored to minimize 
the burden on white employees.136 This remedy is also difficult to terminate because it 
must satisfy the same criteria to be terminated as was required to impose it. A court-
ordered program will only be ended when the defendant-employer illustrates that it has 
achieved a stable racial balance that will not be immediately destroyed.137 The nature of 
the alleged injury relates to the program's constitutionality. There fore, the reviewing 
court must determine whether the lower courts' relief was tailored narrowly enough to 
accomplish the desired remedy.  
The first court-ordered affirmative action case was Firefighters v. Stotts,138 in which a 
group of African-American firefighters filed a class action suit charging the city fire 
department with discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. The parties subsequently 
agreed to a consent decree to remedy these practices.139 Later, the African-American 
firefighters sought an injunction against the fire department to prevent it from following 
its seniority system when the department made layoff decisions. The African-American 
firefighters argued that, by following the seniority system, they would be the first to be 
laid off and they would lose the gains they achieved pursuant to the consent decree. The 
district court agreed, and ordered that layoffs be made in a manner that would protect the 
newly hired African-American firefighters, thereby circumventing the seniority 
system.140 The firefighters union appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court held that 
because Title VII specifically protects bona fide seniority systems, and because the union 
was not a party to the consent decree, the district court abused its discretion in ordering 
the injunction.141  
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The Court found that the original consent decree did not address the issue of layoffs, nor 
did it suggest that the seniority system in place should be ignored.142 Also, it interpreted 
Title VII to protect bona fide seniority systems.143 The Court determined that the district 
court had abused its discretion in altering the seniority system in favor of the African-
American firefighters, because the district court inadvertently granted competitive 
seniority to the minority firefighters.144 The Court explained that pursuant to section 
706(g), a court may grant competitive seniority only to those victims who have directly 
suffered from intentional discrimination.145 Unfortunately, the African-American 
firefighters did not address in their brief the issue of whether the department's seniority 
system intentionally discriminated against the African-American firefighters. In the 
absence of an argument to the contrary, the Court presumed that any discriminatory 
effects were unintentional.146 Therefore, by basing its decision on the questionable 
interpretation that only those intentionally discriminated against may receive 
"competitive seniority," the Court disregarded the legislative intent of Title VII as 
recognized in United Steelworkers, namely to eliminate the effects of prior 
discrimination.  
In Sheet Metal Workers' v. EEOC,147 the government brought suit under Title VII to 
enjoin a labor union and its apprenticeship committee from discriminating on the basis of 
race. The district court ordered the defendants to set a 29% minority membership goal to 
be met by a specified date, and appointed an administrator to make sure that this goal was 
reached. After the union failed to reach these goals, the court, several years later, imposed 
a fine and ordered the union to implement an amended affirmative action program to 
increase minority participation. The union unsuccessfully challenged the validity of these 
orders on Title VII and equal protection grounds.  
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan,148 again interpreted 
section 706(g) as not prohibiting federal courts from ordering race-conscious relief to 
remedy past discrimination in appropriate circumstances.149 The Court also indicated that 
such relief was not restricted to direct victims of past intentional discrimination.150 The 
Court rejected the EEOC's argument that the legislative history of Section 706(g) 
revealed that it was intended to benefit only identified victims of intentional 
discrimination, but instead concluded that Title VII could also provide relief for those 
whom were unintentionally discriminated against.151 However, the Court explained that 
the purpose of section 706(g) was to assure employers that they would not violate the 
statute by merely having a racial imbalance in the work force.152 This would prohibit a 
court from requiring an employer to adopt racial preferences merely to correct a work 
force imbalance, thereby precluding any inequities in the implementation of court-
ordered affirmative action.153  
In the final analysis, the Court decided that the district court's order was not prohibited, 
because the union had a history of persistent and egregious discrimination and the orders 
did not require union membership for those who had been refused admission for non-
discriminatory reasons. The Court also explained that Title VII's purpose is realized by 
allowing courts to order race conscious relief as a class remedy.154 Therefore, because the 
motivation be hind the order was to attack the effects of intentional and continuing 
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discriminatory practices against the class which the union refused to address, the district 
court's order did not violate Title VII.155  
The next case to come before the Court was International Association of Firefighters v. 
City of Cleveland.156 In this case, minority firefighters filed a class action against the city 
of Cleveland, claiming violations of Title VII for discrimination on the basis of race in 
hiring and promoting. The district court adopted, over the union's objection, a consent 
decree that had been agreed to by the plaintiffs and the city. The decree required a 
specified number of promotions to be given to minority firefighters over a four year 
period. The union appealed to the Supreme Court.  
Again the Court was called upon to interpret section 706(g), this time in relation to a 
consent decree awarding hiring and promotional preferences to minority union members 
who were not direct victims of an employer's intentional discrimination. Adhering to the 
legislative intent of Title VII, the Court acknowledged that reasonable race-conscious 
measures meant to achieve the purposes of Title VII were allowable in situations where 
the measures imposed were voluntary.157 Moreover, because Section 706(g) does not 
regulate voluntary agreements providing race conscious relief, the district courts are not 
constrained by the Section 706(g) limits when approving consent decrees.158 Therefore, 
the Court allowed the parties to come to their own solution without overly burdensome 
intervention. This interpretation comports with the true intent of Congress by allowing 
remedial relief to achieve the goals of Title VII.  
The final case in this area was United States v. Paradise.159 In Paradise, the Supreme 
Court reviewed a district court order requiring the Alabama Department of Public Safety 
to promote one African-American trooper for every white trooper promoted to the rank of 
corporal. This requirement was limited in duration, and the African-American trooper 
promoted must have been "qualified" for the position. The same one-to-one ratio was also 
required for upper rank promotions.160  
The district court order was based on findings that the department had a long history of 
excluding African-Americans from employment and promotions, thereby providing a 
basis for a claim of persistent or egregious discrimination. The department also failed to 
adhere to prior court orders.161 Despite past recalcitrance, the department complied with 
the immediate order by promoting eight African-Americans and whites to corporal.162 It 
also submitted an affirmative action plan that provided for fair promotional procedures as 
required by the court.163 Thereafter, the district court discontinued the one to one 
promotional requirement, and allowed the department's program to control promotions, 
because the department had complied with the federal court's mandate. Unfortunately, the 
United States intervened. The Department of Justice challenged the district court order, 
claiming that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it 
overburdened non-minority troopers.164  
The Supreme Court upheld the court order, and held that the promotional requirement did 
not constitute an equal protection violation. Once again writing for a plurality, Justice 
Brennan emphasized that race-conscious affirmative action is a well-established remedy 
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for past and present discrimination.165 The Court declined to formally adopt strict 
scrutiny as the appropri ate measure of the constitutionality of affirmative action 
programs.166 Justice Brennan recognized the Court's inability to reach a consensus on this 
issue, and in so doing, the Court once again avoided the question of the correct level of 
scrutiny to be applied to affirmative action. Brennan dodged the issue of assuming 
arguendo that strict scrutiny applied, and missed an opportunity to demonstrate that the 
program could thereunder pass constitutional muster.167 Brennan determined that the 
race-conscious relief ordered was necessary to serve the compelling governmental 
interest of ending the department's long term, open, and pervasive discrimination in its 
hiring and promotional practices.168 Brennan also found the societal interest in ensuring 
compliance with federal court orders to be compelling, because of the department's 
history of noncompliance with similar federal court orders.169 The promotional 
requirement also satisfied the narrowly-tailored requirement, because it was specifically 
focused to remedy the effect of the department's discriminatory exclusion of African-
Americans from the upper ranks.170  
The Court disagreed with the government's assertion that the program overburdened non-
beneficiaries on several grounds. First, the program was temporary and did not require 
the department to make gratuitous promotions or to create positions in order to fill them 
with African-Americans.171 Second, the provisions of the order requiring prompt 
implementation of the race-neutral promotional procedures were found to be necessary to 
ensure immediate compliance with prior court orders, and to eliminate the harm caused 
by the department's previous delays in implementing the procedures.172 Third, the Court 
felt that deference should be granted to district court orders redressing Fourteenth 
Amendment problems, because the lower courts had first hand experience with such 
problems.173 Therefore, the government's argument was deemed unpersuasive, thereby 
validating the district court's authority to implement affirmative action programs.  
Overall, the opinions of the Court in court-ordered affirmative action cases support an 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII that recognizes the history of 
these enactments and acknowledges the intent of their framers to provide a remedy to 
groups that suffered from historic discrimination. By making such an acknowledgment, 
the federal courts are able to deal directly with these problems. Therefore, regardless of 
which standard is applied, support for fair and equitable affirmative action programs is 
available.  
C. Voluntary State and Local Affirmative Action  
Voluntary state and local affirmative action programs involve situations where public 
employers or governing bodies, at the state or local level, institute programs intended to 
provide equal employment opportunity to minorities or women. These programs are 
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, because government 
action is involved. Therefore, an analysis of these cases is appropriate to a proper 
understanding of equal protection.  
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The case of Wygant v. Board of Education 174 involved a collective bargaining agreement 
between a teacher's union and a local board of education. The agreement provided that 
when layoffs were required, those teachers with the least seniority would be laid off first, 
except at no time would there be a higher percentage of minority personnel laid off than 
the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff.175 As a 
result, the school district laid off several non-minority teachers with greater seniority over 
minority teachers with less seniority. Thereafter, the white teachers challenged the layoff 
policy, claiming that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.  
The Supreme Court supported the petitioners claim and found that the layoff provisions 
violated equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that 
redressing societal discrimination was not a sufficiently compelling reason to justify the 
lay off provision in the affirmative action program.176 To justify such programs, the Court 
required that the respondents provide a specific showing of prior discrimination by the 
governmental entity.177 The Court claimed that general societal discrimination was 
insufficient to provide a compelling state interest, because such discrimination had no 
relationship to the prior discriminatory hiring practices that the affirmative action 
program sought to redress.178 Without a showing of direct discrimination, the Court 
believed, the potential for abuse was high, because the program could be continued after 
its legitimate remedial purpose had been satisfied.179  
This reasoning, unfortunately, does not take into account the intent of the Equal 
Protection Clause, and fails to protect those African-American teachers who had 
previously been discriminated against. Indeed, such reasoning turns the whole intent of 
the Fourteenth Amendment on its head by doing the opposite of what it was intended to 
accomplish.180  
Johnson v. Transportation Agency 181 stands as the only major opinion determining the 
legality of a gender-based affirmative action program under Title VII.182 In Johnson, the 
Santa Clara Country Transportation Agency voluntarily adopted an affirmative action 
program in which the gender of the employee was considered as a factor in making 
promotions. The agency adopted the plan "to achieve a statistically measurable yearly 
improvement in hiring and promoting minorities and women in job classifications where 
they are under-represented. . . . [T]he long-term goal is to attain a work force whose 
composition reflects the proportion of minorities and women in the area labor force."183 
The plan did not require or establish hiring quotas to reach the stated objective.184 The 
agency relied on empirical statistical data to determine the extent of female and minority 
under-representation in its work force.185 Acting under this program, the agency 
promoted a female employee ahead of a male employee who scored higher on the 
qualification exam. The male employee sued claiming a Title VII violation.  
In determining the validity of a voluntary affirmative action plan under Title VII, the 
Court held that the principles articulated in Steelworker's v. Weber must guide the 
analysis.186 To be valid, the plan must first be designed to correct a "manifest imbalance," 
where women are under-represented in "traditionally segregated job categories."187 To 
determine whether such an imbalance exists, the Court approved the comparison of the 
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percentages of women in the workforce with those of the general population in jobs for 
which no special skill is required.188 This requirement of showing a statistical imbalance 
is consistent with Weber and the purpose of Title VII, which is to encourage affirmative 
action.189  
The second consideration was whether the plan, as implemented, "unnecessarily 
trammeled" the rights of male employees.190 The Court reasoned that because the 
applicant's sex was one of many factors the agency considered, a male applicant's sex did 
not operate as a complete bar to promotion.191 Further, male applicants would still remain 
eligible for other, non-program promotions.192 The Court also noted that the agency's 
affirmative action plan was temporary, and it sought to attain a balanced workforce rather 
than to maintain such a balance.193 The Court concluded that for these reasons, the 
agency's voluntary affirmative action program did not unnecessarily trammel Johnson's 
equal employment rights.  
This test, where the Court looks for a manifest imbalance in the workforce and then 
checks to ensure that the rights of non-beneficiaries of the affirmative action program are 
not unduly trammeled, can be seen as a form of more lenient scrutiny of voluntary 
affirmative action programs under Title VII. Employing a more lenient scrutiny thus 
serves the goals of not only Title VII, but also of the Equal Protection Clause, namely, to 
afford minorities equal employment opportunities.  
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 194 the City Council of Richmond passed an 
ordinance requiring prime contractors awarded city contracts to subcontract at least thirty 
percent of the dollar amount of each contract to minority owned businesses. The plan was 
later challenged on equal protection grounds by a prime contractor who had lost a city 
contract after being denied a waiver by the city.  
The Court applied strict scrutiny to the program, and determined that it was 
unconstitutional.195 The Court held that the city did not prove a compelling governmental 
interest sufficient to justify the program because there were no findings of prior 
discrimination that would allow for race-conscious relief.196 Thus, the Court reverted to 
the Wygant analysis, in which a state or locality is required to make a showing of prior 
intentional discrimination in order to be successful in defending its remedial plan. The 
Court determined that the strict numerical set aside required more than assertions that 
discrimination in the construction industry was prevalent or societal.197 Indeed, even 
though the city cited factors, such as a lack of working capital, an inability to meet 
bonding requirements, and a lack of training and experience, contributing to continued 
discrimination in the field, the Court responded that specific acts of prior discrimination 
were required in order for race conscious remedies to be applied.198  
The Court's requirement of intentional past discrimination, of course, does not comport 
with the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment. Requiring specific instances of overt 
discrimination before affirmative action programs are permissible does not assist African-
Americans in being assimilated as full members of the society. Indeed, Justice Marshall, 
in his dissent, explained that there is a vast difference between race conscious remedies 
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employed by a State seeking to remedy the effects of past societal discrimination and 
those meant to perpetuate it.199 Therefore, Justice Marshall rejected the strict scrutiny 
approach and advocated an intermediate level of scrutiny, under which the city ordinance 
in question would have passed.200  
Overall, the Court is applying differing standards depending on the nature of the claim 
filed. Under a Title VII analysis, voluntary state or local affirmative action program is 
allowed, assuming that it can survive the two-part Weber test. The Title VII analysis 
would allow the majority of affirmative action programs to survive so long as they were 
fair to both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. This analysis comports with the 
legislative intent of Title VII. In contrast, when applying a Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection analysis, the Court reverts to a strict scrutiny standard, which requires a 
compelling state interest, and a program narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The 
application of strict scrutiny to a program under review is, of course, nearly fatal in 
fact,201 and does not serve the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Indeed, by applying strict scrutiny, the Court prevents the Equal Protection Clause from 
achieving its intended purpose.  
D. Voluntary Federal Affirmative Action  
Until the recent Adarand decision, affirmative action programs initiated by the federal 
government were consistently analyzed under an intermediate level of scrutiny. These 
programs were afforded a more relaxed standard because of the Court's deference to 
Congress. The Court seemed to be tacitly supporting Congress in continuing the process 
of realizing the overall goal of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII to eliminate the 
effect of discrimination in the work place.  
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,202 the Court approved the provision of the Public Works 
Employment Act of 1977 203 requiring that ten percent of federal funds awarded to state 
and local government entities, for local public works projects, must be used to purchase 
services or supplies from minority owned businesses.204 The program was challenged by 
several contractor associations claiming that the provision violated the concept of equal 
protection inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.205  
The Court asserted that the congressional objective was to ensure that those contractors 
receiving federal funds would not use practices that would allow the effects of past 
discrimination in public contracting to continue.206 The Court held that Congress had the 
power to enact such legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause, because the Act 
imposed economic regulations on private contractors receiving public funds. The Court 
further held that Congress could also impose such requirements on state governments 
pursuant to its enforcement powers contained in Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.207  
The Court explained that the 10% set-aside program at issue in the case was limited and 
properly tailored to remedy the effects of prior discrimination, and was thus permissible 
even though some "innocent" parties may be burdened.208 The Court permitted this type 
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of remedy because Congress has broad remedial powers to enforce equal protection 
guarantees. The Court explained that the provision could apply to specified minority 
groups only because it was not designed simply to benefit those groups, but to remedy the 
effects of prior discrimination by infusing some degree of equity into the contracting 
process.209 In other words, the legislation was meant to dismantle the good-old-boy 
network. Indeed, the Court understood that Congress had authority to employ racial 
criterion in order to accomplish remedial objectives, particularly where federal funds are 
involved.210 Overall, the Fullilove Court acknowledged congressional authority to 
implement the legislative intent of the Fourteenth Amendment and other equal protection 
laws through the use of proactive programs.  
Similarly, in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,211 the Court determined that two minority-
inclusive policies, adopted by the FCC to comply with its statutory duty to promote 
diversity in programming under the Communications Act of 1934,212 were valid. One 
policy provided an "enhancement" to minority owned or operated businesses applying for 
a radio or television broadcasting license to be used as a weighing factor to determine 
whether such applicants would receive a license. The other policy allowed stations in 
danger of losing their licenses to transfer the license to a qualifying minority business. 
Both programs were challenged under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.  
The Court upheld the FCC policies, thereby granting appropriate deference to the 
congressional intent that these programs remain in place.213 The racial components of 
these policies were examined under an intermediate level of scrutiny, under which the 
program needed merely to serve an "important" government purpose, and be 
"substantially related" to the achievement of that purpose.214 The Court recognized that 
the promotion of broadcast diversity constituted an important purpose, and the program 
instituted by the FCC was sufficiently related to that goal. Therefore, the affirmative 
action program did not establish an equal protection violation.215  
Overall, until the Court's recent decision in Adarand, it was assumed that federal 
affirmative action programs were constitutional as long as they did not overstep their 
bounds and become unfair to non-beneficiaries. Although the Fullilove Court did not 
resolve the question of which specific standard would be applied to federal affirmative 
action programs, the Metro Broadcasting Court settled on a standard of intermediate 
scrutiny. This standard gives proper deference to congressional power to enact 
affirmative action programs that attempt to realize the goal of putting an end to racial 
discrimination.  
V. PART IV: THE ADARAND CASE  
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,216 the Supreme Court reconsidered the proper 
level of scrutiny applicable to federal affirmative action set-asides. A federal contractor 
for a highway construction project, Mountain Gravel & Constructors Co. (MGC), 
received additional compensation, pursuant to the contract with the Department of 
Transportation (DOT), for hiring "disadvantaged" firms as subcontractors. 
"Disadvantaged" firms are defined by the Small Business Act as being owned by "Black 
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Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other 
minorities, or any other individual found to be disadvantaged."217 DOT established a ten 
percent set aside for all disadvantaged firms in federal highway contracts pursuant to the 
Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (STURAA),218 
which provides that not less than ten percent of funds appropriated for highway contracts 
be expended for the benefit of socially and economically disadvantaged firms.219  
Adarand Constructors, a non-minority firm, submitted the lowest bid on the $100,000 
contract, but did not receive the contract; MCG awarded the subcontract to Gonzales 
Company, a minority firm, despite the fact that Adrand's bid was $1,700 lower. MGC 
testified that Adarand would have received the contract but for the incentive provided 
pursuant to STURAA regulations.220 Adarand thereafter filed suit. Both the Federal 
District Court for the District of Colorado and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
found in favor of DOT. Adarand appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the racial 
classification, and the presumption of economic and social disadvantage, are an unfair 
burden on white firms that do not benefit from this presumption. Adarand also argued 
that the 1.5% compensation for hiring "disadvantaged" firms impermissibly burdened his 
equal protection rights as a non-beneficiary.  
A. Opinion  
The Court began with a historical overview of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
and its relation to equal protection. It recounted the Japanese curfew internment cases,221 
which granted almost unlimited deference to federal regulations by separating the 
obligations of equal protection as between the states and federal government.222 As time 
went by, the Court began to recognize that the Due Process Clause in the Fifth 
Amendment incorporated the idea of equal protection.223 Indeed, by 1975, the Court 
explicitly provided that the equal protection provisions in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments were equivalent.224 Therefore, the Court agreed with Adarand that its claim 
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment provided sufficient grounds upon which to base an 
equal protection violation. This decision allowed the Court to apply a Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection analysis to the regulation at issue.  
After determining that a Fourteenth Amendment analysis should apply, despite the fact 
that Adarand brought suit under the Fifth Amendment, the Court next reviewed a 
procession of affirmative action cases where affirmative action programs were challenged 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. In all of the cases discussed, the burdened group 
was a member of the majority in the citizenry. In the early cases Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke,225 Fullilove v. Klutznick,226 and Wygant v. Board of Education 227 
the Court could not assemble a majority, but a plurality of the Court both validated and 
invalidated affirmative action programs. In these decisions, the Justices disagreed on the 
level of scrutiny to be applied to affirmative action programs which provide a preference 
based on race and are intended to address discrimination and its effects on those 
burdened. The conservative Justices supported the application of strict scrutiny.228 Under 
this analysis, any racial classification would be a suspect classification and, therefore, 
receive the most involved examination of the need for the program and the extent to 
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which the program achieved that need without exceeding its limits. The liberal Justices, 
on the other hand, considered such programs to be benign in nature, as the intent of the 
programs was to remedy past discrimination and its lingering effects. These justices 
supported an intermediate level of scrutiny.229 Under this approach remedial programs 
initiated to combat past and present racial discrimination would receive a less strenuous 
level of review and have a better opportunity to survive a constitutional inquisition. 
Consequently, Justice O'Connor determined that there was no prior consensus on the 
proper standard to be applied concerning race-conscious classifications under equal 
protection analysis.230  
The Court next discussed the strict scrutiny analysis applied in Richmond v. Croson,231 
citing it as the controlling precedent on the issue.232 The Court extended Croson to make 
strict scrutiny applicable to all government programs that involve race.233 Unfortunately, 
the Court overruled its decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,234 which determined 
that race-conscious federal programs intended to benefit minorities constituted "benign" 
discrimination and, therefore, were subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.235  
Justice O'Connor supported the Court's decision to abandon Metro Broadcasting by 
claiming that the prior Supreme Court opinions in this area up to Croson  
had established three general propositions with respect to governmental 
racial classifications. First, skepticism: any preference based on racial or 
ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination. 
Second, consistency: the standard of review under the Equal Protection 
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a 
particular classification, i.e., all racial classifications reviewable under the 
Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized. And third, 
congruence: equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the 
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.236  
The Court determined that the Metro Broadcasting decision threatened the efficacy of 
these three basic principles by incorrectly interpreting the Fourteenth and Fifth 
Amendments to protect groups rather than persons.237 Adhering to these three 
propositions, the Court held that any governmental classification based on race must be 
subject to strict scrutiny.238  
Concerning the "skeptical" prong of the argument, Justice O'Connor applied a strict level 
of scrutiny intended to take "relevant differences" into account in order to determine the 
legitimacy of the use of race.239 The determination of which programs pass muster will, 
of course, be made by the Supreme Court, but both benign and invidious discrimination 
will now be analyzed under the same strict scrutiny criterion.  
The consistency argument arises out of a strict literal interpretation of the equal 
protection provisions; an individualistic interpretation in which group identity is 
insignificant and individual rights control. Thus, the Court will measure government 
action by its effect on the individual, and examine an affirmative action program through 
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the same lens as any other governmental action where race is considered. The new test 
requires the federal government to demonstrate that a compelling governmental interest is 
involved.240 The congruence argument is explained through the Court's earlier historical 
analysis in determining that the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment equal protection 
provisions employ the same analysis.241  
Overall, the Court held that federal classifications must serve a compelling governmental 
interest and be narrowly tailored to further that interest in order to be valid.242 The Court 
intones that only in cases of overt discrimination will the validity of federal affirmative 
action programs be upheld. The Majority alluded to United States v. Paradise 243 as an 
illustration of the type of facts necessary to justify an affirmative action program. 244 In 
Paradise, the Court validated an affirmative action program because of the "pervasive, 
systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct of the Alabama Department of Public 
Safety."245 Therefore, only in these most outrageous situations will the Court approve a 
program to remedy discriminatory practices. In all other cases, the harshness of strict 
scrutiny will find programs intended to provide equal opportunity to be unconstitutional 
because they breach equal protection.  
In dissent, Justice Stevens explained that the major deficiency in the majority opinion is 
that it fails to acknowledge the difference between race conscious regulations intended to 
assist individuals that have been discriminated against and race-conscious regulations 
intended to further discriminate against such individuals.246 Particularly, Justice Stevens 
found that the consistency argument espoused by the Majority contradicts the legislative 
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, by its inability to differentiate between oppression 
and assistance.247  
Ever since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, ensuring the constitutionality of 
the Freedmen's Bureau Bills,248 it has consistently been understood to afford special 
benefits on minorities in general, and African-Americans in particular. Justice Harlan 
understood this intent, and fought vigorously to uphold it in his dissent from the 
Majority's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases.249 Most of the Presidents serving in this 
century have also understood this intent. President Roosevelt made the first attempt to 
eliminate discrimination against African-Americans in the employment context,250 by 
enforcing the rights that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred upon that entire group. 
President Kennedy continued the crusade.251 President Johnson oversaw the enactment of 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, which took great strides in fulfilling the promises 
made by the Fourteenth Amendment.252 President Nixon coined the term "affirmative 
action," and ordered a race-conscious program to ensure the equal employment 
opportunities of African-Americans in federal departments and agencies.253 President 
Carter issued a number of executive orders designed to ensure employment 
inclusiveness.254  
Additionally, the Supreme Court's opinions upholding court-ordered affirmative action 
programs under Section 706(g) of Title VII, and its deference to congressionally 
mandated affirmative action programs, further demonstrate the true intent of the Civil 
Rights Acts to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.255 The Court's 
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opinion in Adarand directly contravenes this well-established, historical understanding of 
the intent and practical application of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
The federal government, along with all other employers in the United States, has 
historically exercised both overt and covert discrimination against African-Americans, 
other minorities, and women.256 Because of this past and present reality, the current 
judicial trend to eliminate affirmative action programs is a very troubling development. 
The involvement of politicians in the national rhetoric 257 should not have been 
unanticipated, because of the political benefits of opposing affirmative action, but it is 
unsettling to observe the Supreme Court taking such a hostile position as well.258 The 
effect of the majority opinion in Adarand is to support a particular political philosophy 
instead of remaining politically neutral.259  
A Court composed primarily of strict constitutional constructionists is supposed to adhere 
to the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution. Therefore, under normal 
circumstances, the Court as presently constituted would be expected to render decisions 
based on an understanding of the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment. Contrary 
to the Majority in Adarand, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the civil rights 
laws intended for race to be considered as a factor in the legislative decision making 
process. The Majority's simplified "colorblind" analysis of the Constitution directly 
contradicts the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment to acknowledge racial inequities 
present in the nation, and to address them directly with race-conscious remedies. It is a 
more practical method for providing employment inclusion to take race into account 
when making employment decisions than is the Majority's analysis, which declines to 
allow the consideration of race.260  
As the legislative intent of laws attempting to level the playing field have shown, it is 
necessary to acknowledge race as a factor and provide some remedial action in order to 
alleviate the historic problem of racial inequity. Therefore, it should have been incumbent 
upon those members of the Majority in Adarand to follow the legislative intent of laws 
attempting to ensure equal employment opportunity through affirmative action programs. 
Simply stated, the Adarand opinion misinterprets the original intent of the Equal 
Protection Clause, cripples congressional efforts to implement that intent through civil 
rights legislation, and should be overturned at the Court's first opportunity to do so.  
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71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994) (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 602).  
72. Id. ("Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be 
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to determine whether the government has provided sufficient procedural protections 
against erroneously or arbitrarily depriving a person of their life, liberty, or property. 
Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 1984). In order to sustain a 
procedural due process attack, it must be shown that a deprivation of a liberty interest 
existed, within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, and that the 
procedures utilized in that deprivation were not adequate. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 332 (1975). In Mathews, the Court held that the specific requirements of the 
Due Process Clause depend on three factors:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id. at 335. Based on a balancing of these three factors, a determination can be made 
regarding the procedural sufficiency of a particular practice. See id. at 347.  
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994) ("[T]ermination . . . shall be limited in its effect to the 
particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found. . . 
.").  
75. Id. ("[T]he head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of 
the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved 
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a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action." (referring to a 
termination or refusal to grant funds to a prior beneficiary found in noncompliance)).  
76. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 stat. 241, 253 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1994)).  
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1994). The statute provides:  
The term "person" includes one or more individuals, governments, 
governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, 
associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-
stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in 
cases under Title 11, or receivers. 
Id.  
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).  
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). Section 2000e(k) states, in relevant part:  
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit 
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work . . . . 
Id.  
80. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 202, 105 Stat. 1081 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)).  
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703).  
82. § 2000e-2(a). Subsection (a)(1) provides:  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
Id.  
83. § 2000e-2(a)(2). Subsection (a)(2) states:  
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It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 
Id.  
84. § 2000e-2(j). Subsection (j) admonishes:  
Nothing contained in this subchapter [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.] shall be 
interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to 
any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance 
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons 
of any race . . . employed by any employer . . . in comparison with the 
total number or percentage of persons of such race . . . in any community, 
State, section or other area. 
Id.  
85. The Supreme Court has held that quotas are illegal under both Title VII and the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 705).  
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706).  
88. § 2000e-5(b). Subsection (b) provides:  
If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall 
endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by 
informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion. 
Id.  
89. § 2000e-5(f).  
90. § 2000e-5(c).  
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a 
State ... which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful 
employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or 
local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute 
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criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, 
no charge may be filed under subsection (a)[(b)] by the person aggrieved 
before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been 
commenced under State or local law. . . . 
Id. This provision must be read in conjunction with § 2000e-5(d), which requires the 
Commission to inform the State in which the alleged violation occurred and allow the 
State to act before commencing its own enforcement proceedings.  
91. The constitutionality of injunctions issued by federal courts will be addressed infra 
notes 136-73.  
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1994) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 717).  
93. The EEOC can issue only procedural regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12. It cannot 
issue substantive "rules." Dobbins v. Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (D.C. Ohio 1968). 
While the EEOC's interpretation of title VII is entitled to "great deference," Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 91 S. Ct. 849, its interpretation is not binding on the court. General 
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 410 (1976). However, an employer who in good 
faith relies on EEOC guidance may claim immunity from liability. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-
12(b).  
94. The procedural regulations are set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 1607 et. seq. (1995).  
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1994) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 718).  
96. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).  
97. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See generally Charles J. Cooper, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Antonio: A Step Toward Eliminating Quotas in the American Workplace, 14 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 84 (1991) (discussing Wards Cove and its intended effect).  
98. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57. The court demanded that employment 
discrimination plaintiffs show a disparity between the racial composition of those 
employed in a particular position and that of the qualified members of the relevant labor 
pool. Further, the Court held that the plaintiff must also demonstrate causation between 
the employment policy and the disparity.  
99. Id. at 659.  
100. Id.  
101. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, §§ 105(a), 106, 107, 105 Stat. 1074 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)).  
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102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (1994). ("The demonstration referred to by 
subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, 
with respect to the concept of 'alternative employment practice.'"). Wards Cove, 490 U.S. 
642, was decided June 5, 1989.  
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (1994).  
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994).  
105. Id. ("If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is 
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the 
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice 
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate. . . .").  
106. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), reprinted as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).  
107. Id. at § 202.  
108. Id. at § 206(a).  
109. Id. at § 209(a)(5).  
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994).  
111. Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1969), reprinted as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). The Order stated:  
It is the policy of the Government of the United States to provide equal 
opportunity in Federal employment for all persons, to prohibit 
discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, handicap, or age, and to promote the full realization of 
equal employment opportunity through a continuing affirmative program 
in each executive department and agency. 
Id.  
112. Id. at § 2.  
113. Id. at § 3.  
114. Exec. Order No. 12,067, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,967 (1978), reprinted as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (This order basically implemented Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 
Fed. Reg. 19,807 (1978)).  
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115. Exec. Order No. 12,086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,501 (1978), reprinted as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).  
116. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 
2000d-1 (1994).  
117. Exec. Order No. 12,259, 46 Fed. Reg. 1,253 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000 
d-1 (1994).  
118. 28 C.F.R. § 42.404 (1994).  
119. 28 C.F.R. § 42.405 (1994).  
120. 28 C.F.R. § 42.406(a) (1994).  
121. 28 C.F.R. § 42.407(c) (1994).  
122. Exec. Order No. 12,250 § 1-201, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 
2000d-1 (1994).  
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 602) ("No such action shall 
be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or 
persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance 
cannot be secured by voluntary means.").  
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1994) (Civil Right Act of 1964 § 603) (requiring judicial 
review option in accordance with § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, and such 
agency action is not limited by unreviewable agency discretion).  
125. 42 C.F.R. § 410 (1994).  
126. Only one major court decision in this area has been decided.  
127. 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (the 5-2 decision was the greatest degree of consensus of any 
case in which affirmative action was at issue).  
128. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) ("[Title VII] must 
therefore be read against the background of the legislative history of Title VII and the 
historical context from which the Act arose . . . Congress' primary concern . . . was with 
'the plight of the Negro in our economy.'")).  
129. Id. at 203 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) ("The crux of the problem was to 
open up employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been 
traditionally closed to them . . . ." (referring to the intent of the framers of Title VII)).  
130. Id. at 204. Justice Brennan explained:  
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It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over 
centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who 
had 'been excluded from the American dream for so long,' constituted the 
first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race conscious efforts 
to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. 
Id.  
131. Id. at 205.  
132. Id. at 206-07.  
133. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).  
134. Id. at 208 ("The purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute. Both were designed 
to break down old patterns of racial segregation and ierarchy.").  
135. Id. at 208 (stating the reasons why the voluntary affirmative action program was 
constitutional under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).  
136. George Rutherglen, After Affirmative Action: Conditions and Consequences of 
Ending Preferences in Employment, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 339, 357 (1992).  
137. Id. at 358.  
138. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).  
139. Id. at 565.  
140. Id. at 567.  
141. Id. at 583.  
142. Id. at 574.  
143. Id. at 575.  
144. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579 (1984).  
145. Id at 579-83 (interpreting § 706(g) of Title VII through its previous decision in 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), which awarded relief only to "actual" 
victims of discrimination). Determining actual victims is very problematic though, 
because it requires a definition which will explain the limits of who is actually 
discriminated against. According to Senator Humphrey:  
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No court order can require hiring, reinstatement, admission to 
membership, or payment of back pay for anyone who was not fired, 
refused employment or advancement or admission to a union by an act of 
discrimination forbidden by this title. This is stated expressly in the last 
sentence of section 707(e) [enacted without relevant changes as §706(g)] . 
. . Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is 
nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court to 
require . . . firing . . . of employees in order to meet a racial 'quota' or to 
achieve a certain racial balance. That bugaboo has been brought up a 
dozen times; but it is non existent. 
Stotts, 477 U.S. at 580-581 (1984) (citing the Senator's remarks in 110 CONG. REC. 6549 
(1964)).  
146. Id. at 579.  
147. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).  
148. The Plurality consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. 
Justice Powell, in his separate concurring opinion, agreed that remedial action was not 
limited to only those directly discriminated against.  
149. Id. at 482-83. Six of the Justices agreed that race conscious relief for Title VII 
violations were appropriate in the proper circumstances. Justice Brennan defined 
"appropriate circumstances" as situations where courts are "confronted with an employer 
or labor union that has engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination or such relief 
may be necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." Id. at 445 
(emphasis added). This rationale supports the understanding that Title VII was enacted 
specifically to address discrimination visited against minorities.  
150. Id. at 483.  
151. Id. at 445 n.25.  
152. Id. at 453.  
153. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 475 (1986). The Court 
advised district courts to use discretion in imposing such remedies. The Court all but 
forbade the district courts from ordering an affirmative action plan when the only 
evidence is an imbalanced workforce. The courts can, however, use the existence of a 
racially imbalanced workforce as a factor in determining if judicial relief is necessary.  
154. Id. at 474-75 (stating that employing a Stotts interpretation in this case would 
"distort" the language of Title VII and would not achieve the intent of the equal 
employment opportunity purpose).  
40
Akron Law Review, Vol. 29 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol29/iss2/6
155. Id. The Plurality also determined that the order did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because it served a compelling government 
interest and was narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 481. In dictum, Justice 
Brennan explained that the burden on non-minorities would have been insignificant. Id.  
156. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986).  
157. Id. at 515-18. The fact that the affirmative action program approved in Firefighters 
was established pursuant to a consent decree distinguishes this case from Stotts. A 
consent decree is not the same as a § 706(g) injunction. The district court can approve a 
consent decree even if the consent decree provides "relief" greater than that which the 
district court is authorized to order under § 706(g). Id. at 526, 528. Therefore, because the 
Court was reviewing the district court's power to approve a consent decree, and not 
reviewing its power to issue a § 706(g) injunction, Stotts is distinguishable.  
158. Id. at 519-21. By reviewing the legislative history, the Court realized that the intent 
of the section was to protect managerial prerogatives from overly burdensome judicial 
intervention. Id. The statutory limits on the district court's power to modify a disputed 
consent decree are not implicated when the original decree was wholly voluntary. Id. at 
528.  
159. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).  
160. Id. at 163 (concerning upper rank promotions, the officer promoted had to be 
qualified, the rank promoted to had to be less than 25% African-American, and the order 
remained in effect so long as the department had not developed and implemented a 
promotion plan for the particular rank that was fair to African-American troopers).  
161. Id. at 162-63 (stating that Alabama had not complied with prior similar court 
orders).  
162. Id. at 165.  
163. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 165 (1987).  
164. The Reagan Justice Department was infamous for its lax enforcement of equal 
employment opportunity laws. Neal Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68 Texas 
L. Rev. 353, 353 (1989) (It was the intent of the Reagan Justice Department to limit race-
conscious affirmative action.).  
165. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 166.  
166. Id.  
167. Id. at 167. See infra notes 147-167 and accompanying text.  
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168. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171.  
169. Id. at 170-71.  
170. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 180 (1987) (stating that the requirements 
were meant to help the department achieve its goal in an expeditious manner).  
171. Id. at 177-78.  
172. Id. at 179-81.  
173. Id. at 184-85.  
174. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).  
175. Id. at 270.  
176. Id. at 274, 279-84. Justice Powell explained that an attempt to remedy societal 
discrimination by providing role models for minority schoolchildren was not a 
compelling state interest. Id.  
177. Id. at 274. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)). 
In order to demonstrate prior discrimination, a comparison must be shown between the 
racial composition of the school's teaching staff and the racial composition of the 
qualified public school teachers in the labor market). Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308.  
178. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.  
179. Id. at 275-76.  
180. The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to assure the constitutionality of race-
conscious measures intended to address the problems of racism against African-
Americans. See supra notes 22-35.  
181. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).  
182. The petitioners in both Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1988), and 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), based their claims on a 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation.  
183. Johnson, 480 U.S. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  
184. Id.  
185. Id. at 621.  
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186. Id. at 631.  
187. Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
188. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987). If the job is one 
requiring special skill or training, then the employer may compare the percentages of its 
minorities in those positions to the percentage of minorities in the general population who 
have those same special skills.  
189. Id. at 632-33. It should also be noted that an employer's plan must also avoid "blind 
hiring," or hiring based solely on statistics, and which does not take individual 
qualifications into account. Id. at 637.  
190. Id. at 637.  
191. Id. at 638.  
192. Id.  
193. Id. at 639.  
194. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).  
195. Id. at 498-506.  
196. Id. at 499-500.  
197. Id. at 498-99.  
198. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989).  
199. Id. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
200. Id. at 535-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
201. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice 
Marshall coined the phrase, "strict in theory, but fatal in fact," in referring to the 
imposition of a strict scrutiny standard.).  
202. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).  
203. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified in significant part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
6705(e)-6707(j) (1994)).  
204. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 492.  
43
Brody: A Historical Review of Affirmative Action
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996
205. Because the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply 
to the federal government, there was some initial confusion as to whether Congress must 
respect equal protection principles. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the 
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment encompasses 
the notion of equal protection of the laws, and that federal legislation could thereby be 
challenged as unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.  
206. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980).  
207. Id. at 475-80. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "The Congress 
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." 
U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV, § 5. This has been interpreted to grant Congress vast 
authority to implement legislation designed to achieve its goal.  
208. Id. at 484 (citing Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976)).  
209. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473 (The Court interpreted the provision at issue in the Act to 
ensure that beneficiaries of federal funds would not allow the effects of prior 
discrimination to continue.).  
210. Id. at 490.  
211. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).  
212. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1994).  
213. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 600 (Congress enacted legislation ending the 
agency's examination of the policies in question, thereby prohibiting any alteration in the 
policies).  
214. Id. at 565.  
215. Id. at 582-83. The Court explained that the conclusion that greater minority 
ownership of telecommunications stations produced greater broadcast diversity was 
reached pursuant to a great amount of empirical evidence and was not based on mere 
stereotypes. Id.  
216. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).  
217. Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(c) (1994). The Small Business Act 
further stipulates that members of the designated racial and ethnic minority groups are 
pressured to be socially disadvantaged. 15 U.S.C. §§ 637(a)(5), 637(d)(2), (3); 13 C.F.R. 
§ 124.105(b)(1) (1994). Non-minority firms are entitled to challenge an award to a 
minority firm by rebutting the presumption that the firm is economically disadvantaged. 
13 C.F.R. §§ 124.111(c), (d) 124.105(b)(1) (1994).  
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218. Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (1987). See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103.  
219. STURAA § 106(c)(1). See also Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103.  
220. Pursuant to the contract, "The Contractor will be paid an amount computed as 
follows: 1. If a subcontract is awarded to one DBE, (Disadvantaged Business Enterprise), 
10 percent of the amount of the approved DBE subcontract, not to exceed 1.5 percent of 
the original amount." Adarand Constr. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2104 (1995).  
221. Id at 2106. (These were the unfortunate cases decided during World War II which 
supported the federal decision to intern and impose strict curfews on Japanese-American 
citizens). See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).  
222. The Fourteenth Amendment applied only to state action, therefore no protection was 
provided for discriminatory federal action because the Fifth Amendment only referred to 
the right to receive due process of the law.  
223. Adarand Constr. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2107 (1995) (citing McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).  
224. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)). The Buckley Court explained that the 
equal protection analysis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are co-equals. 424 
U.S. 1 (1976).  
225. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion) (employing a strict scrutiny test in finding 
an affirmative action program adopted by a university medical school in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, but allowed the school to consider race 
as a factor in making its admissions decisions).  
226. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See supra notes 201-10 and accompanying text.  
227. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.  
228. This group included Justices Powell, Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens.  
229. This group included Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall.  
230. Adarand Constr. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2109-10 (1995).  
231. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Croson, as discussed previously, involved a 30% set aside 
program in Richmond, Va., and was challenged pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Croson Court held that "strict-scrutiny" should be applied in all actions involving 
race by a state or local government. Therefore, programs such as the 30% set-aside 
involved did not pass constitutional muster because the court felt that the city did not 
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demonstrate strong enough evidence to prove either that the remedial action was 
necessary or narrowly tailored. Therefore, the Court invalidated the Richmond program.  
232. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110 ("With Croson, the Court finally agreed that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all race-based action by state and local 
governments.").  
233. Id. at 2117.  
234. 497 U.S. 547 (1991).  
235. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.  
236. Id. at 2111 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
237. Id. at 2112. (Justice O'Connor also asserts that the basic principles of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments are to protect persons not groups).  
238. Adarand Constr. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).  
239. Id. at 2111 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (plurality 
opinion); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491 (1980); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 523 
(Stewart, J., dissenting)).  
240. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 494 (1989) (plurality opinion); Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978) (Powell, J., 
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